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What Money Market Mutual Fund Reform Means for 
Banks and Money Market Deposit Accounts 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 23, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) issued the final Money Market Fund Reform rule (the 
“Reform”),1 which amended the rules governing money market mutual 
funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940 by requiring 
institutional,2 non-governmental money market mutual funds 
(“MMMF”)3 to transition away from the historical use of a stable net 
asset value (“NAV”) of $1.00 per share to a floating NAV.4 Essentially, 
the Reform requires MMMFs to base the value of their shares on the 
current market-based value of the securities in their underlying 
portfolios.5 This new requirement, along with newly imposed liquidity 
fees6   and  redemption  gates,7   is  a  significant  change  to  institutional 
 
1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund 
Reform Rules (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542347679#.VMkeomjF9 
UQ. 
2. Institutional investors are large, complex, educated investors who generally invest 
money on behalf of other people. Non-institutional investors are, by definition,  any 
investors that aren’t institutional, including people and organizations who invest their own 
money. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Georgia State 
University J. Mack Robinson College of Business Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk 
(CEAR) Workshop: Institutional Investors: Control, Liquidity, and Systemic Risk (Apr. 19, 
2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808#.VMoM3WjF_44) 
3. Only institutional MMMFs are required by the Reform to use a floating NAV, 
which provides a two year window for compliance. Money Market Fund Reform; 
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 47932, 47794 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be  
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
4.    Id. at 47739. 
5. Id. (“Rounded to the fourth decimal place (e.g., $1.0000).”). 
6. Liquidity fees are a new tool allowing funds to impose a fee of up to 2% on 
shareholder redemptions if the fund’s weekly liquidity level falls below the required 
regulatory threshold of 30% of its total assets and the fund’s board of directors “determines 
that imposing a fee or gate is in the fund’s best interests.”  Id. at 47747. 
7. Redemption gates are a new tool allowing funds to “temporarily suspend 
[shareholder] redemptions for up to 10 business days in a 90-day period, if the  fund’s 
weekly liquid assets fall below 30% . . . and the fund’s board of directors . . . determines  
that imposing a fee or gate is in the fund’s best interests.” Id. 
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MMMFs.8 The sponsors of the MMMFs will face implementation, 
accounting, recordkeeping, and taxation issues in addition to the 
onslaught of competition from banks that will result from the changing 
regulatory scheme.9 The funds’ investors may face recordkeeping and 
liquidity issues.10 
This Note considers the impact that the Reform will have on the 
financial products industry, and specifically, on banks that offer money 
market deposit accounts (“MMDA”), which are direct competitors of 
MMMFs.11 Part II provides a background on MMMFs  and  the 
“breaking the buck” phenomenon.12 Part III addresses attempts to 
decrease the riskiness of MMMFs in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis and the “breaking of the buck” event in September 2008.13  Part  
IV details the requirements of the Reform and the issues discussed by 
commenters to the Proposed Rule.14 Part V analyzes the costs and 
opportunities that the Reform will present to banks that provide 
MMDAs.15 Part VI concludes by offering some final thoughts on the 
future of MMMFs.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Id. The Reform does not impose any changes to “retail” MMMFs. See infra Part 
III.B. 
9. See infra Part V. 
10. KATHLEEN JOAQUIN ET AL., INV. CO. INST., OPERATIONAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED 
REDEMPTION RESTRICTIONS ON MONEY MARKET FUNDS 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_operational_mmf.pdf (observing that MMMFs have created 
arrangements with investors that will be “drastically impaired” by redemption restrictions, 
even under normal conditions). 
11. Kathy Kristof, Money Market Deposit Accounts and Mutual Funds, NOLO.COM 
(Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/money-market-deposit-accounts- 
mutual-funds-30007.html. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Part IV. The SEC issued proposed amendments to Rule 2a-7 which called 
for implementation of a floating NAV system of accounting for institutional non- 
governmental MMMFs and provided narrower definitions of retail and governmental funds. 
Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 47739 (Aug. 
14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
15. See infra Part V. 
16. See infra Part VI. 
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II. MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS AND “BREAKING THE BUCK” 
 
 
A. An Overview of Money Market Mutual Funds 
 
An MMMF is a type of mutual fund17 typically offered by 
investment companies18 as a short-term alternative to interest-bearing 
bank accounts.19 MMMFs typically generate greater yields on “idle 
funds” than interest-bearing bank accounts.20 For example, while funds 
in a bank savings deposit account accrue interest at “artificially low” 
rates set by the bank, MMMF shareholders receive interest based on the 
current market rates.21 Although MMMFs do not have the benefit of 
federal deposit insurance,22 they are required to invest in low-risk,23 
highly liquid securities such as Treasury bills24 and certificates of 
deposit (“CDs”).25     MMMFs  also  invest in commercial  paper26  issued 
 
17. “A mutual fund is a type of investment company that pools money from many 
investors and invests the money in stocks, bonds, money-market instruments, other 
securities,      or    even     cash.” Mutual      Funds,      SEC.     &    EXCH.     COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
18. An investment company invests the money it receives from its investors in 
securities and other assets. The investors share in the profits and losses of the investment 
company in proportion to their interest in the investment company itself. “Investment 
companies are regulated primarily under the Investment Company Act of 1940 . . . [but] are 
also subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” See 
Investment Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinvco.htm 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Kristof, supra note 11. 
19. See Money Market Funds, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). A yield generally 
refers to the annual income return on an investment. What’s in a Yield?, AM. INST. OF 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, http://www.aaii.com/investing-basics/article/whats-in-a- 
yield?adv=yes (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
20. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 52 (4th ed. 2010). 
21. Id.; Money Market Funds, supra note 19. 
22. Money Market Funds, supra note 19. 
23. Id. 
24. Treasury bills are securities “issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on 
behalf of the federal government” which mature in one year or less. Bonds, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://investor.gov/investing-basics/investment-products/bonds#.VD0JRPnF_Wc 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
25. A Certificate of Deposit is a special type of deposit account with a bank that offers 
a higher rate of interest than a regular savings account and features federal deposit insurance 
up to $250,000. Certificates of Deposit: Tips for Investors, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/certific.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
26. Commercial paper consists of short-term, promissory notes with maturities of thirty 
days, but sometimes ranging up to 270 days, issued primarily by corporations. Commercial 
Paper,        BD.        OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.        RESERVE SYS., 
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by financial institutions, including banks.27 Historically, MMMF 
managers have maintained a stable NAV of $1.00 per share,28 meaning 
that $1.00 invested may be redeemed at any time in the future for at  
least $1.00.29 
The $2.6 trillion MMMF industry30 consists of three primary 
types of MMMFs: retail funds, government funds, and institutional 
prime funds.31 Retail funds are those that have “policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to limit all beneficial owners of the fund to natural 
persons.”32 Government funds principally hold debt of the U.S. 
government, including obligations of the U.S. Treasury and federal 
agencies.33 Institutional prime funds, on the other hand, are invested 
primarily in corporate securities and the shares of the fund are  
purchased by institutional investors.34 
Institutional investors include all sizes of companies, state and 
local governments, and financial institutions.35 These investors “use 
[MMMFs] as a cost-effective way to manage and diversify credit risk36 
while providing same-day liquidity with market-based yields.”37 
Historically, the advantage of being able to redeem shares on demand at 
a stable value of $1.00 per share has been a cornerstone of the benefits 
of investing in institutional MMMFs.38    As will be discussed later, the 
 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
27. Money Market Funds, supra note 19; Dave Michaels, SEC Takes Aim at Money 
Market Fund Runs as it Approves Rules Allowing Floating Prices, 30 Tax Mgmt. Fin. Plan. 
J. (BNA) No. 18, at 206 (July 23, 2014). 
28. Except where they have “broken the buck.” See Money Market Funds, supra note 
19; see also infra Part II.B. 
29. Michaels, supra note 27, at 206. 
30. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735,  
47740 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
31.    Id. at 47738. 
32.    Id. at 47794. 
33.    Id. at 47738. 
34. They also invest in governmental securities.  JOAQUIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
35. Id. 
36. Credit risk is “the probability that a loan will not be repaid according to the terms  
of the contract.” EDGAR RUSSELL FIEDLER, MEASURES OF CREDIT RISK AND EXPERIENCE 
(GENERAL SERIES/NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH) 10–18 (1971). 
37. For purposes of this section, a market-based yield is a yield that is similar to yields 
from investments in the same market and with similar risk levels. JOAQUIN ET AL., supra  
note 10, at 6. 
38. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1 (describing the provisions 
of the finalized rule and providing information about proposed Treasury and IRS rules); see 
Michaels, supra note 27, at 206. 
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removal of this benefit by the Reform will cause major issues for 
institutional MMMF sponsors, investors, and other stakeholders in the 
MMMF industry.39 
 
B. “Breaking the Buck” 
 
A MMMF “breaks the buck” when the value of its shares falls 
below their standard $1.00 value because the quantity of shares 
redeemed in a short period of time is so large that the resulting change  
in the liquidity of the fund cannot support the $1.00 valuation.40 When 
this occurs, the MMMF’s shareholders are not able to redeem their 
shares for the $1.00 that they originally invested. As a result, the 
shareholders recognize a loss if they redeem shares when the MMMF’s 
share value has fallen below $1.00.41 A decline in share value in one 
MMMF can lead investors in other MMMFs to make a “runs” on their 
shares.42 If allowed to continue, “breaking the buck” can create a 
market-wide “run” on all MMMFs and widespread financial panic.43 
Fortunately,  MMMFs  have  only  “broken  the  buck”  twice in 
U.S. history.44 The most recent example occurred when the Reserve 
Primary Fund (the “Fund”)45 reduced the price of its shares to $0.97 the 
day after Lehman Brothers announced its bankruptcy in September 
2008.46 The Fund broke the buck when Lehman Brothers’ short-term 
debt, which represented just 1.2% of the Fund’s portfolio, drastically 
 
39. See infra Part V. 
40. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735,  
47741 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
41. See Claes Bell, Money Market Funds Safer with New Rules, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 
20, 2010), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/investing/money-market-funds-safer-with-new- 
rules-1.aspx. 
42. A “run” occurs when a large number of shareholders redeem their shares in a short 
amount of time. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. First, the Community Bankers Mutual Fund in 1994, and second, the Reserve 
Primary Fund in 2008. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market Funds 
Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 313, 
315 (2014). 
45. The Reserve Primary Fund was very large money market mutual fund that “broke 
the buck” following the downfall of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch in 2008. Money 
Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47744. 
46. The Reserve Primary Fund held a $785 million (1.2% of the fund’s assets) position 
in Lehman Brothers commercial paper when they declared bankruptcy. Id.  at  47744. 
Default in a position held by a MMMF that is greater than 0.5% of the fund’s assets can 
cause a MMMF to “break the buck.”  Id. at 47741. 
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dropped in value.47 This relatively low percentage-based exposure was 
well below the 5% single-issuer maximum set by the SEC rules then in 
effect.48 After the Fund announced it would break  the  buck, 
shareholders began redeeming large amounts of shares not only in the 
Fund, but in other institutional MMMFs as well.49 
Within one week, institutional investors withdrew a staggering 
$300 billion from the institutional prime MMMF market, representing 
14% of the assets in those funds, and causing further panic in the 
market.50 As the redemptions increased, the managers of the funds 
attempted to maintain liquidity by holding cash instead of investing it in 
short-term investments like CDs and commercial paper.51 As a result, 
issuers of CDs and commercial paper, such as banks and large 
corporations, were unable to finance their short-term cash needs because 
the liquidity in the short-term financing markets had frozen.52 Because 
investors feared the liquidity risk53 of institutional prime MMMFs, they 
moved hundreds of billions of dollars into governmental funds over the 
course of a few months.54 This large transition away from institutional 
prime MMMFs triggered the SEC to adopt rules to address the risk of 
“runs” on MMMFs.55 
III. ATTEMPTS TO DECREASE THE RISK OF MMMFS IN THE WAKE OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
A. 2010 Amendments to Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act 
of 1940 
 
In 2010, the SEC adopted several amendments to Rule 2a-7 of 
the   Investment   Company  Act   of  1940   to   address   concerns  over 
 
 
47. See Gordon & Gandia, supra note 44, at 315. 
48. Id. 
49. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47744. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. The risk that MMMFs would freeze redemptions. 
54. Richard G. Anderson & Charles S. Gascon, The Commercial Paper Market, the 
Fed, and the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis, 91 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.,589–612 
(2009). 
55. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47745. 
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MMMFs that arose during the 2008 financial crisis.56 The SEC 
commented that the 2010 amendments “were designed to make money 
market funds more resilient by reducing the interest rate, credit and 
liquidity risks of fund portfolios.”57 Specifically, the amendments 
restricted the amount of low-quality securities that MMMFs were 
allowed to hold, provided liquidity thresholds for the funds, and 
increased the amount of information that the funds are required to report 
to the SEC and to the public.58 While  these  amendments reduced the 
risk of MMMFs, the SEC proposed amendments in 2013 to address 
additional concerns in the MMMF market.59 
 
B. 2013 Proposed Rule 
 
In 2011, after the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and a U.S. 
Government debt ceiling impasse, the SEC proposed additional 
amendments to Rule 2a-7 (“Proposed Rule”).60 Along with imposing 
redemption gates and liquidity fees for institutional funds,61  the 
Proposed Rule narrowed the definitions of retail and government 
MMMFs62  and provided that institutional prime MMMFs were required 
 
 
 
56. The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates the organization of mutual funds. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789. The purpose of the Act 
is to “minimize conflicts of interest that arise in” many areas of the finance industry, 
including mutual funds. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#invcoact1940 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
“The Act requires [mutual funds] to disclose their financial condition and investment 
policies to investors when stock is initially sold and, subsequently, on a regular basis.” Id. 
Thus, the Act requires disclosure “to the investing public of information about the fund and 
its investment objectives, as well as on investment company structure and operations.” Id.; 
see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. Rule 2a-7 of the Act 
specifically addresses the regulation of MMMFs and “governs the maturity length, credit 
quality and diversity of debt that money-market funds can hold.” See Daniel E. Levin, 
Breaking the Buck: The End for Money Mark Mutual Funds as We Know Them, 28 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 747, 771 (2009). 
57. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. 
58. See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47745. 
Additional requirements include: “post[ing] portfolio information on their Web sites each 
month, providing investors with important information to help them make better-informed 
investment decisions.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
59. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47739. 
60. Id. 
61. See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47739. 
62. Apart from narrowed definitions of retail and governmental MMMFs, these mutual 
funds were not affected by the proposed amendments.  Id. at 47759. 
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to implement a floating NAV.63 
The Proposed Rule narrowed the definition of “retail” funds to 
those MMMFs that limit daily redemptions to $1 million.64 
“Government” funds were defined by the Proposed Rule as MMMFs 
that invest at least 80% of their assets in cash, government securities, 
and/or fully collateralized repurchase agreements.65 The Proposed Rule 
also required institutional MMMF managers to impose a 2% liquidity 
fee on shareholder redemptions if the fund’s weekly liquid assets66 fell 
below 15%.67 Additionally, the Proposed Rule allowed an institutional 
MMMF’s board of directors to suspend redemptions for up  to thirty 
days if the fund’s weekly liquid assets fell below 15%.68  This  gate 
would automatically lift once the fund’s weekly liquid assets rose above 
30% of the fund’s total assets.69 
 
C. Industry Response to Regulatory Changes 
 
The SEC received over 1,400 comments in response to the 
Proposed Rule,70 yet industry professionals conceded that the SEC had 
“struck a  reasonable balance.”71    Others, however,  argued that the new 
 
 
63.    Id. at 47739. 
64. ROPES & GRAY, ALERT: SEC ADOPTS REFORMS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 9  
(Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.ropesgray.com/news-and- 
insights/Insights/2014/August/ SEC-Adopts-Reforms-for-Money-Market-Funds.aspx 
(providing an overview of the reform, including comparisons of the proposed and final 
regulations and discussion of the practical issues with implementation). 
65. Id. at 5. 
66. Weekly liquid assets include cash, direct obligations of the U.S. Government, 
government securities, securities that will mature within five business days, and amounts 
receivable and due unconditionally within five business days on pending sales of portfolio 
securities.  Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(34) (2014). 
67. “Unless the MMMF Board determines that imposing the liquidity fee is not in the 
fund’s best interest.”  ROPES & GRAY, supra note 64, at 6. 
68. Money Market Funds, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(34). 
69. ROPES & GRAY, supra note 64, at 5–6. 
70. See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 
47739 (Aug. 14, 2014) (noting comments received from “money market funds, investors, 
banks, investment advisers, government representatives, academics, and others”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
71. Christopher Condon, BlackRock, Fidelity Back SEC’s Money-Fund Solution, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 23, 2014 4:39PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014- 
07-23/blackrock-supports-new-sec-rules-for-money-market-funds (quoting Nancy Prior, 
Head of Fixed Investing, Fidelity) (discussing the persistence of the SEC in its MMMF 
amendments and how some of the biggest fund managers have given up “years of fighting 
tighter regulations” and concluded that they can accept the new rules). 
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rules “impose ‘significant[] and costly daily operational burdens on 
money-fund users, limiting the utility of such funds as a cash 
management tool[]” without preventing the runs on MMMFs that the 
rules were designed to address.72 Federated Investors,73 for example, 
stated that the SEC acted without “any evidence that instituting a 
floating net-asset value would do anything to eliminate runs.”74 
Other commenters have pointed out additional negative effects 
of the Reform.75 M&T Bank Corporation observed  that  splitting 
funds,76 which have historically served both retail and institutional 
investors, into separate retail and institutional funds will pose a 
significant cost to existing MMMFs that service both retail and 
institutional investors.77 Commenters also stated that requiring 
institutional prime MMMFs to use a floating NAV will push investors 
out of the market, and likely into MMDAs.78 
Furthermore, commenters pointed out that the liquidity fees and 
redemption gates required under the Proposed Rule would cause 
preemptive runs by institutional investors who anticipate that an  
MMMF may be approaching the liquidity threshold of 15%.79 As one 
might expect, if investors anticipate that liquidity fees or redemption 
gates will be imposed by the funds and the investors then redeem their 
 
72. Id. 
73. Federated Investors is one of “the most vulnerable” institutional MMMF managers, 
according to some, with MMMF assets generating about 40% of the firm’s annual revenue. 
Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Comment Letter from William J. Farrell, Exec. Vice President, M&T Bank Corp., 
to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03- 
13/s70313-251.pdf. 
76. The Proposed Rule as well as the Reform provide that MMMFs which have both 
retail and institutional investors will need to reorganize in separate money market funds for 
retail and institutional investors, in order to qualify as a retail fund and maintain exemption 
from the floating NAV requirement faced by institutional MMMFs. Money Market Fund 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 47799 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
77. Comment Letter from William J. Farrell, supra note 75 (“[R]equiring the creation 
of ‘retail’ and ‘institutional’ prime money market funds will place a significant burden on 
prime money market fund sponsors . . . .”). 
78. See Comment Letter from Cecelia A. Calaby, Senior Vice President, Am. Bankers 
Ass’n, to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm. (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-181.pdf; Comment Letter from William J. 
Farrell, supra note 75; see also infra Part V. 
79. Sean Collins & Chris Plantier, “Preemptive Runs” and Money Market Fund Gates 
and Fees: Theory Meets Practice, INV. CO. INST. (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_14_theory_practice_gates. 
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shares before the thresholds are met, the resulting preemptive action 
may be equivalent to an actual “run” on the fund.80 As a result of the 
issues identified and discussed by industry professionals and academics, 
the SEC made several significant changes to the Proposed Rule before 
adopting the Reform. 
 
IV. THE REFORM 
 
 
A. Changes to the Proposed Rule 
 
One of the key differences between the Reform and Proposed 
Rule is the loosening of the definitions of “retail” and “government” 
funds. These funds were only affected by the final Reform due to 
changes in what constitutes each, and then only to those funds which 
were subject to the new requirements of institutional funds under the 
final Reform due to their reclassification as “institutional.”81 In the 
Reform, unlike the Proposed Rule, “Retail” funds are designated as 
those with “policies and procedures reasonably designed to limit all 
beneficial owners of the fund to natural  persons.”82  “Government” 
funds, on the other hand, are defined in the Reform as those MMMFs 
that invest at least 99.5% or more of their assets in cash, government 
securities, or fully collateralized repurchase agreements.83 
The Reform also relaxes the liquidity fee and redemption gate 
thresholds.84 A liquidity fee of “1% [is required] if the fund’s weekly 
liquid assets fall below 10% . . . unless the MMMF board determines 
that imposing the liquidity fee is not in the fund’s best interest.”85 The 
Reform also allows suspension of redemptions86 for up to ten days in a 
rolling  ninety-calendar-day  period  if  weekly  liquid  assets  fall below 
 
80. The substantive requirements of the Reform are not imposed on retail and 
government money market funds. These funds are mentioned here to address the disparate 
treatment that the Reform imposes on institutional, retail and government funds, which were 
treated equally prior to the 2010 and 2014 amendments. Id. 
81. The liquidity fees and redemption gates, however, do apply to retail funds. Money 
Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47739. 
82. Id. at 47794; ROPES & GRAY, supra note 64. 
83. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47794. 
84. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47739. 
85. Compare id. with 78 Fed. Reg. 36834, 36848 (proposed June 19, 2013) (requiring a 
2% fee under the Proposed Rule). 
86. i.e., a redemption gate. 
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30%, instead of the thirty business day suspension and 15% threshold 
suggested by the Proposed Rule.87 
 
B. Requirements of the Reform 
 
 
1. Floating Net Asset Value 
 
By  removing  the  valuation  exemption  allowing  for  a  stable 
$1.00 per share value, the SEC now requires institutional MMMFs to 
value their shares at a floating NAV.88 A main purpose of a floating 
NAV is to remove the “first mover advantage” found in a stable NAV 
fund.89 The “first mover advantage” is the investor’s incentive to make 
early redemptions from a stable NAV fund90 when the investor  
perceives that the redemptions will continue until all liquidity is 
removed from the fund and the fund will break the buck, thereby 
potentially causing the investor to lose money if he redeems his  
shares.91 The floating NAV achieves this goal through a system of 
valuation known as “basis point rounding,” whereby the MMMF shares 
are valued to the nearest 1/100th of 1%—one  basis  point.92 
Traditionally, this “penny rounding” method was used for stable NAV 
funds, which resulted in shares being valued to the nearest 1%.93 
The basis point rounding method adopted through the Reform 
eliminates “the first mover advantage” inherent in the stable NAV 
model by removing the  disparity between the  fund’s redemption  value 
 
 
87. The requirement that gates will automatically lift once the fund’s weekly liquid 
assets increases above 30% of the fund’s assets did not change from the Proposed Rule. 
ROPES & GRAY, supra note 64. 
88. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47739. 
89. Id. 
90.    Id. at 47775. 
91. This is also referred to as an investor attempt to avoid the “cliff effect”. The “cliff 
effect” occurs in a stable NAV fund when the fund has large losses in its portfolio assets and 
simultaneously experiences heavy redemptions, causing remaining investors to “receive at 
most 99 cents for every share remaining, while redeeming investors receive the full $1.00, 
even if the market value of the fund’s portfolio had not changed.” Id. at 47778. Under the 
final Reform, a MMMF which transacts under a floating NAV, the “cliff effect is minimized 
because (assuming pricing to four decimal places) the ‘cliff’ is 1/100 of the size compared  
to when a money market fund is priced using penny rounding. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. 
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and the value of its underlying securities.94 The “first mover advantage” 
of redeeming shares in a stable NAV MMMF is the benefit realized by 
“the first investors to redeem from a stable value [MMMF] that is 
experiencing a decline in its NAV. . . as a result of [prior] valuation and 
pricing methods, which allow[ed] them to receive the full stable value  
of their shares even if the fund’s portfolio value [was] less.”95 Thus, by 
eliminating the “first mover advantage,” the basis point rounding model 
relieves funds of the stress of honoring redemptions using liquidity that 
may already be limited by losses in their holdings.96 
While only directly affecting institutional MMMF sponsors, 
investors, and stakeholders,97 a floating NAV results in much greater 
daily fluctuations of fund share prices.98 Under current tax  law, 
MMMFs are required to track the timing of these fluctuations, the 
purchase price of sales executed, and other transaction data in order to 
determine and report capital gains and losses for tax purposes.99 The 
SEC claims that these tax burdens will be eliminated by the Treasury 
Department (the “Treasury”) and Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).100 
Accordingly, the Treasury and IRS proposed rules on July 28, 
2014,101—that would allow MMMFs and their investors to treat floating 
NAV MMMFs as though they have a stable NAV—eliminates the need 
for   burdensome   basis   tracking   and   complicated   gain   and   loss 
 
 
94. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47774. 
95. Id. 
96.    Id. at 47775. 
97. Entities that rely on the funds for short-term financing. 
98. See infra Part IV. 
99. Id. at 47783.  The New Rule reads as follows: 
 
First, under tax rules applicable at the time of the Proposing Release, 
floating NAV money market funds (or their shareholders) would be 
required to track the timing and price of purchase and sale transactions 
in order to determine and report capital gains or losses. Second, floating 
NAV funds would be subject to the ‘‘wash sale’’ rule, which postpones 
the tax benefit of losses when shareholders sell securities at a loss and, 
within 30 days before or after the sale, buy substantially identical 
securities. These tax consequences generally do not exist  today,  
because purchases and sales  of  money market  fund shares  at  a  stable 
$1.00 share price do not generate gains or losses. 
 
Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Method of Accounting for Gains and Losses on Shares in Certain Money Market 
Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 144 (proposed July 28, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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calculations.102 The Treasury and the IRS also released a final revenue 
procedure on July 23, 2014,103 providing that the wash-sale104 rules will 
not apply to redemption of floating NAV MMMF shares.105 If the new 
proposed rules are not adopted, funds will face significant accounting 
and reporting burdens related to gain and loss tracking and the wash  
sale provisions.106 
 
2.  Other Requirements of the Reform 
 
As discussed in Part IV(A) of this Note, the Reform requires 
imposition of liquidity fees and redemption gates if certain conditions 
are met and the MMMF’s board determines that such actions are in the 
best interest of the fund.107 Additionally, the Reform imposes new 
reporting requirements on MMMFs.108 Among these reporting 
requirements is an increase in website disclosure based on the daily 
 
 
102. Linda Beyoud, Set of Guidance Simplifies Compliance with SEC Changes to  
Money Market Funds, [2014] Banking Daily (BNA) July 24, 2014. 
103.    Rev. Proc. 14-45, 2014-34 I.R.B. 388. 
104. Section 1091(a) disallows recognition of a loss which was realized by a taxpayer  
on a sale of shares of stock or securities if, within thirty days before and after the date of the 
sale, the taxpayer acquires substantially identical stock or securities. I.R.C. § 1091(a) 
(2014). 
105. The new Treasury Department and IRS regulations and revenue procedure have 
been received favorably by most industry professionals. Beyoud, supra note 102.; John 
McColley, Sweeping Money Market Fund Reforms Adopted By SEC, VALUE WALK, 
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/07/money-market-reforms-sec/ (last visited Feb. 11,  
2015); see also Michaels, supra note 27, at 206 (citing several industry professionals who 
feel the change is positive); Tax News Flash: Rev. Proc. 2014-14, Proposed Regulations – 
Simplified Treatment of Certain Redemptions of Floating-NAV Money Market Fund Shares, 
Not To Be Part of Wash Sale, KMPG LLP (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.kpmg.com/us/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/taxnewsflash/pages/2014 
-1/rev-proc-2014-45-proposed-regulations-simplified-treatment-of-certain-redemptions-of- 
floating-nav-money-market-fund-shares-.aspx   [hereinafter   Tax News  Flash]. But  see 
Federated Reacts to Money Fund Rule Change, FEDERATED (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.federatedinvestors.com/FII/leaf/display.do?cid=112777&link=emmm 
(suggesting that MMMF sponsors and investors should have been given an opportunity to 
review and comment on the solution). 
106. See Michaels, supra note 27 at 206 (citing several industry professionals who feel 
the change is positive); Tax News Flash, supra note 105. 
107. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. The Reform specifically 
provides that the MMMF board of directors have the ability to determine whether liquidity 
fees and redemption gates are in the best interest of the fund. Id. Liquidity fees and 
redemption gates serve as a tool MMMF managers can use to immediately and directly 
address runs. Id. 
108. See id. at 5 (describing the provisions of the finalized rule and providing 
information about proposed Treasury and IRS rules). 
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fluctuations in the basis of the shares, including “levels of daily and 
weekly liquid assets, net shareholder inflows or outflows, market-based 
NAVs per share, imposition of [liquidity] fees and [redemption] gates, 
and any use of affiliate sponsor support.”109 
The Reform also contains new “material event” disclosure 
requirements, which include notifications110 of liquidity fees and 
redemption gate issuances, portfolio security defaults, and sponsor or 
fund affiliate support.111 MMMFs are now required to immediately 
release information relating to the fund’s holdings, including 
information relevant to assessing risk.112 
In addition, MMMFs must comply with  increased 
diversification requirements for the securities in their underlying 
portfolios.113 The Reform requires that an MMMF not invest more than 
10% of its assets in any one issuer or group of affiliated entities.114 
These requirements, together with the outstanding tax implications and 
the two-year implementation period,115 have yet to be resolved by the 
Treasury and IRS, represent significant changes to the MMMF industry, 
and present both obstacles and opportunities for investors, sponsors, 
stakeholders, and competitors of institutional prime MMMFs. 
 
 
 
 
 
109. Id. 
110. Which must be filed on Form N-CR with the SEC. 
111. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. 
112. See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735, 
47783, 47815–31 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 
279) (including information relating to fees and gates, sponsor support, effects of fees and 
gates on redemptions, and daily website disclosure of daily and weekly liquid assets, net 
shareholder flows, and current NAV). 
113. Id. at 47783. The Reform requires that “all of a money market fund’s assets meet 
the 10 percent diversification limit, . . . thereby removing the so-called 25 percent basket  
that permitted as much as 25 percent of the value of securities held in a money market  
fund’s portfolio to be subject to guarantees or demand features form a single institution.” 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 1. 
114. Affiliated entities include an investment advisor. Money Market Fund Reform; 
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47783. Id. Additionally, “[MMMFs] would be 
required to treat the sponsors of asset-backed securities as guarantors subject to the 10% 
diversification limit . . . unless the [MMMF’s] board of directors . . . determines that the  
fund is not relying on the sponsor’s financial strength . . . to determine the asset-backed 
security’s quality or liquidity.” Id. 
115. The final implementation date is October 14, 2016. Money Market Fund Reform; 
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47932. 
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V. COSTS AND OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE REFORM 
 
The Reform requires only institutional MMMFs to implement a 
floating NAV system,116 providing a compliance date of October 14, 
2016.117 Investors in institutional MMMFs “use the same-day liquidity 
[of the fund] to fund . . . payroll, purchases of inventory, insurance 
premiums, equipment purchases, and capital improvements.”118 In 
addition, businesses that regularly engage in short-term financing and 
rely on MMMFs to purchase their commercial paper, will also be 
affected because tightened liquidity and diversification requirements 
imposed by the Reform will disincentivize, if not outright bar, MMMFs 
from purchasing riskier and less-liquid commercial paper.119 While 
many of these entities are banks,120 a significant number are large 
corporations as well as state and local governments.121 
State and local governments will be hit particularly hard because 
MMMFs hold nearly 72% of their outstanding short-term bonds greater 
than $500 billion.122  A decrease in demand for MMMF shares will  
cause a corresponding decrease in MMMFs portfolios, which will 
inevitably cause a decrease in demand for MMMF purchases of 
municipal securities.123 With the demand for state  and  local  
government  commercial paper  reduced,  governmental  entities will be 
 
 
116.    Id. at 47794. 
117. Institutional MMMFs were solely targeted by the SEC in the Reform because retail 
and government funds have not historically been affected by market pressures on liquidity 
that institutional funds have both challenged with. Id. 
118. See Comment Letter from William J. Farrell, supra note 75. 
119. See Yin Wilczek, Corporate Community, Municipalities Pan SEC’s Money Market 
Fund Reform Measures, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 254 (July 23, 2014) (quoting 
David Hirschmann, president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for 
Capital Markets Competitiveness) (“A floating NAV does not address [the risk of runs on 
MMMFS] and would severely if not irreparably harm the viability of the product, taking 
away a key cash management product and a primary source of funding for the commercial 
paper market . . . . Companies that invest in money funds or that rely on  money funds to  
buy their short-term debt will be forced to find alternate, higher cost sources of short-term 
financing and investment.”). 
120. Michaels, supra note 27, at 206. 
121. See Sridhar Natarjan & Adam Janofsky, Money Market Fund Rule Seen Triggering 
Commercial Paper Jam, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 320 (July 31, 2014) (discussing 
the impact the Reform will have on the commercial paper market). 
122. Comment Letter from Dustin McDonald et al., Director, Fed. Liaison Ctr., Gov’t 
Fin. Officers Ass’n,, to U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-187.pdf. 
123. Id. 
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forced to look for other, likely more expensive, short-term financing, 
such as bank loans.124 As  a result of the increase in financing costs,  
state and local governments may be forced to delay or cancel crucial 
infrastructure projects, which were planned assuming the availability of 
stable and affordable financing provided by MMMFs.125 
In addition to state and local governments, commercial non- 
financial entities will also be affected by the tightening of the short-term 
financing market.126 With the decrease in MMMF demand for 
commercial paper, the largest issuers of such paper will be forced to 
meet their short-term financing costs through other options, including 
bank loans and government MMMFs.127 With the influx of the largest, 
most creditworthy businesses into less utilized short-term financing 
markets, such as government MMMFs, smaller, less creditworthy 
companies that traditionally found financing in these markets will find it 
increasingly difficult to secure funding.128 Consequently, these less 
creditworthy entities may be forced to look towards other, more 
expensive options, including bank financing. 129 
 
A. Opportunities for Banks as Alternatives to MMMFs 
 
The Reform presents opportunities for banks on two fronts.130 
First, banks may become an alternative investment vehicle to 
MMMFs.131 Second, banks might serve as an alternative source of 
funding for entities which have typically relied on MMMFs.132 
 
 
 
124. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
125. McDonald, supra note 122. Margaret Hassan, Governor of New Hampshire, and 
Deval Patrick, Governor of Massachusetts, both commented that the reform will affect the 
ability of their respective states to fund school projects. Comment Letter from Margaret 
Hassan to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-257.pdf; Letter from Deval Patrick to U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03- 
13/s70313-217.pdf. 
126. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
127. Comment Letter from James Gilligan, Assistant Treasurer, Great Plains Energy, 
Inc., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-384.pdf. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See infra Part V.A.1–2. 
131. See Comment Letter from William J. Farrell, supra note 75, at 5. 
132. See infra Part V.A.2. 
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1. Banks are an Alternative Investment Vehicle 
 
With many companies looking to avoid the floating NAV, 
liquidity fees, and redemption gates required of MMMFs after the 
Reform is fully implemented on October 14, 2016, there will be greater 
interest in storing cash in MMDAs.133 Banks will likely see an increase 
in investors interested in their MMDA offerings and thus, a 
corresponding increase in revenue from reinvestment  activities.134  
These reinvestments will likely help offset the costs of their own 
increased short-term financing costs.135 
With Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
insurance on most MMDAs covering up to $250,000,136 banks will be 
an attractive alternative for small to mid-size companies and state and 
local governments who previously invested in MMMFs, which have no 
FDIC insurance. While MMDAs will not earn as high of a return as 
MMMFs, companies have few comparable options. Thus, companies 
whose investment strategies require relatively liberal liquidity levels 
will likely increase their use of depository accounts such as MMDAs.137 
State and local governments that find themselves unable to meet 
the accounting and recordkeeping requirements mandated by the  
Reform will similarly be forced to look for alternative investments such 
as MMDAs, which usually produce a lower  yield.138  The combination 
of the threat of liquidity fees and redemption gates, as well as the 
floating NAV requirements, will likely also influence their desire to  
seek alternatives to MMMFs.139 Additionally, state and local 
governments may be required by law to invest only in funds that have a 
stable NAV, which would preclude them from entering the MMMF 
market altogether.140 These factors will likely drive state and local 
governments to use MMDAs offered by commercial banks as a short- 
term   investment   vehicle.      Banks   with   MMDA   offerings  should 
 
133. Kristof, supra note 11. 
134. See Comment Letter from William J. Farrell, supra note 75, at 5; see also infra Part 
V.B. 
135. See infra Part V.B. 
136. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (FDICA), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(1)(E) 
(West 2013). 
137. Gilligan, supra note 127. 
138. McDonald, supra note 122. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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strategically advertise them to existing and potential corporate, state, 
and local government clients, while banks without MMDA offerings 
should work to develop and implement them into their product. 
 
2.  Banks as an Alternative Source of Financing to MMMFs 
 
The second opportunity for banks arises from those companies 
that borrow short-term money by issuing commercial paper, which is 
then traditionally purchased by MMMFs141—in other words, those 
businesses who use MMMFs as a source of financing.142 Regarding 
these companies, banks have a significant opportunity to serve as an 
alternative short-term financing source.143 This relatively common 
practice of financing short-term operating needs with commercial paper, 
which has historically been purchased by MMMFs, presents a great 
opportunity for banks to expand their services.144 If the predicted 
outflow of $500 billion of corporate and governmental entity funds  
from institutional MMMFs is correct, the resulting decrease in demand 
for commercial paper by MMMFs will result in corporations searching 
for short-term financing elsewhere.145 Those companies that find 
themselves without MMMF funding will be forced to seek financing 
from other sources—likely banks.146 One of these options is the 
revolving bank credit line, which generally has higher interest rates and 
longer terms than commercial paper.147 
State and local governments that find themselves unable to 
secure buyers for their commercial paper—or who are forced out of 
similar short-term financing markets by their new, larger competitors— 
will also be forced to look for more expensive short-term financing 
alternatives.148    While banks will have to consider the composition of 
 
 
141. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. (quoting Thomas Deas, treasurer of FMC Corp., which had $600 million of 
commercial paper outstanding at the end of its first quarter); see supra Part V. 
145. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. According to James Gilligan, assistant treasurer at Great Plains Energy Inc., his 
company’s short-term financing costs would increase by 500%. Id. 
148. Comment Letter from Dustin McDonald, Director, Federal Liaison Ctr., Gov’t Fin. 
Officers Ass’n, to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-03-13/s70313-220.pdf. 
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their portfolios and the costs associated with taking on low-yielding 
municipal debt, there may be tax-planning benefits that make the tax- 
free debt an attractive investment for banks as well as their clients. By 
working with their existing state and local government clients to 
develop short-term lending solutions, and by taking advantage of 
opportunities to lend money at increased rates compared to MMMFs, 
banks will be able to mitigate their short-term financing costs by 
capitalizing on their own opportunities.149 
 
B. Increased Short-Term Financing Costs for Banks 
 
Similar to large corporate entities and state and local 
governments, banks rely heavily on short-term financing from MMMFs 
purchasing their commercial paper.150 Any reduction in  MMMF  
demand for commercial paper will have a significant impact on the 
short-term financing costs of banks, similar to the effect it has on 
businesses and governments.151 
As previously discussed, MMMFs will likely purchase smaller 
quantities of commercial paper as a result of the  Reform.152  As 
investors seek alternative options for short-term cash deposits, the 
institutional prime MMMF market will correspondingly shrink.153 As a 
result, MMMFs will purchase smaller amounts of bank-issued 
commercial paper, forcing banks to look for alternative sources of short- 
term financing.154 These alternatives will likely be more expensive, 
thereby increasing the short-term financing costs155 of the banks  
because it is extremely unlikely that banks will take on a heightened 
level of risk.157 This is due to the tight regulation on bank liquidity  
levels which will force them to avoid higher risk, lower cost 
alternatives.158  The most  straightforward  option  for  banks to mitigate 
 
149. See infra Part V.B. 
150. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
151. Id. 
152. See infra Part V. 
153. See infra Part V.B. 
154. See Natarjan, supra note 121. 
155. See Wilczek, supra note 119. 
157. Wilczek, supra note 119. 
158. Banks can avoid higher risk alternatives by paying higher interest rates on their 
debt, extending the duration of their current financing agreements, or obtaining financing 
from other banks who are in a better financial position.  See Natarjan, supra note 121. 
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the effect of these increased financing costs is to pass the costs along to 
their customers by increasing fees or increasing interest rates on  
loans.159 However, pushing these cost pressures onto  customers will 
have a negative effect on the attractiveness of the bank’s services to its 
clients and potentially cause the bank to lose those clients to  
competitors who keep their short-term financing costs down by utilizing 
the most cost-efficient financing.160 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Reform finalized by the SEC on July 23, 2014, is a 
significant departure from the historical treatment of institutional 
MMMFs.161 The floating NAV requirement will discourage many 
institutional investors from investing in MMMFs in the future.162 If the 
market for institutional MMMFs is reduced, which this Note suggests 
will happen, the stress created by the reduction will be felt not only by 
sponsors and investors of the funds, but also by those borrowers who 
depend on the funds as a source of short-term financing.163 This strain 
presents an opportunity for banks to pull business away from MMMFs 
by offering attractive alternatives such as MMDAs and perhaps even 
new short-term financing and investment vehicles164 that trump the 
Reform’s negative effects on MMMFs.165 By taking advantage of this 
opportunity, diligent banks will be able to offset their own increased 
financing costs and perhaps earn a net profit from the effects of the 
Reform. 
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159. Joseph Lawler, New Banking Rules Could Raise Cost Of Borrowing, Critics Warn, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 5, 2014), http://washingtonexaminer.com/new-banking-rules- 
could-raise-cost-of-borrowing-critics-warn/article/2552884. 
160. See Natarjan, supra note 121. 
161. Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47735,  
47783 (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274 & 279). 
162. Id. 
163. Natarjan, supra note 121. 
164. Possible new financing and investment vehicles are not considered in this Note. 
165. See supra Part V. 
